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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND STEWART, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN L. SULLIVAN and 
RICHARD MONK ALLEN, 
Defendants and AppeJ,lants. 
JOHN L. SULLIVAN, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
RICHARD MONK ALLEN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
12958 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
RICHARD MONK ALLEN 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was a personal injury action by plaintiff-respondent 
Raymond Stewart against defendants-appellants John L. Sulli-
van and Richard Monk Allen resulting from an automobile 
accident. By reason of plaintiff-respondent Stewart's failure 
to answer written interrogatories, his action was ordered dis-
missed as against both defendants-appellants on April 2, 1971. 
On May 25, 1972 and after a series of proceedings before 
the District Court that commenced on March 16, 1972, an 
order was entered designating that the original dismissal was 
without prejudice. 
1 
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(It should be noted that the heading of this case in-
cludes another lawsuit in which John L. Sullivan is plaintiff 
against Richard Monk Allen as defendant. This was also a 
personal in jury action relating to the same accident as in-
volved in the case on appeal and these cases were ordered 
consolidated in the District Court. However, there is nothing 
before this court on appeal relating to this second case, and 
it was dismissed by order of the District Court dated April 
19, 1971. The record on appeal from the District Court is 
somewhat confusing. It consists of two volumes with one 
supposedly relating to each of these two cases. Some of the 
pleadings in the Stewart v. Sullivan and Allen case are in the 
Sullivan v. Allen volume and visa versa. Hereafter in this brief, 
page citations to the Record (or R.) shall refer to the larger 
volume containing a total of 108 pages. Any reference to a 
page in the other volume shall be preceded by Sullivan Record 
(or S.R.) . Also, the parties shall be referred to by their sur-
1 ... ames or as plaintiff or def end ant. ) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Originally, the District Court ordered dismissed the plain· 
tiff's complaint as against both defendants. No mention was 
made in the order as to whether the dismissal was with or 
without prejudice. That ruling remained undisturbed from 
its entry on April 2, 1971 until March 16, 1972 when the 
first of a series of orders was entered purporting to alter the 
effect of the one entered April 2, 1971. The last of these was 
entered May 25, 1972 and purports to amend the e~fe~ 0!, 
the one entered April 2, 1971 to make it "without preiudJCe. 
All proceedings in the District Court commencing with the 
2 
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April 2, 1971 order and ending with the last order of May 
25, 1972 were before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
District Court Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and appellant Richard Monk Allen seeks to 
have set aside the order of May 25, 1972 and to have rein-
stated the original order of dismissal entered April 2, 1971. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident giving rise to this lawsuit occurred on 
November 22, 1968 at approximately 4:00 p.m. a short dis-
tance south of Lagoon on U.S. Highway 91 which then 
consisted of a divided highway with two lanes going each 
way. The facts of the accident are in sharp dispute and are 
wholly immaterial to the issues before the court on this ap-
peal, as are the nature and extent of the plaintiff Stewart's 
injuries, although Stewart's attorney has succeeded in placing 
his version of the facts and the plaintiff's injuries before this 
court by means of attaching a so-called "Exhibit A" to an 
affidavit which he filed in support of one of his motions in 
connection with this matter. ( R. pp. 72 through 79) 
It is the contention of Allen that he was in no way re-
sponsible for the accident and that any dispute or controversy 
as between him in his vehicle and Sullivan in his had ceased 
a substantial distance north on the highway from where the 
accident occurred. Allen's contention is that as he was trav-
eling south in the inside southbound lane with Sullivan also 
traveling south in the outside southbound lane and just slightly 
3 
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m fr~nt of him, that Sullivan suddenly and without any 
warning made a lane change immediately in front of him 
that caused the rear bumper of the Sullivan vehicle to come 
in contact with the front bumper of the Allen vehicle and 
which propelled the Sullivan vehicle into the median strip 
where it overturned. At the time, Stewart was a passenger 
of Sullivan's under a car pool arrangement and was returning 
home from work at Hill Air Force Base. 
Stewart's complaint was filed on March 20, 1969. (R. 
p. 1) His attorney then and at all times through April 2, 
1969 was J. Lambert Gibson. Following certain discovery, 
Mr. Gibson filed a notice of readiness for trial on July 27, 
1970. (R. p. 38) On September 24, 1970, written inter-
rogatories were mailed to Mr. Gibson by Sullivan's attorney, 
Robert E. Schoenhals, since deceased. Shortly thereafter, the 
clerk of Salt Lake County assigned the case a trial date of 
February 16, 1971. (R. p. 39) Commencing in November 
of 1970 and continuing in to early January of 1971, attempts 
were made by the attorneys for Allen and Sullivan to have 
Mr. Gibson answer the written interrogatories mailed to him 
on September 24, 1970. (S.R. pp. 17, 18) With the 
trial approaching, the requested information was essential for 
any possible evaluation that might have resulted in settle-
ment of the claim. Finally, and on January 11, 1971 and 
after no response was had from Mr. Gibson to informal re· 
quests that the interrogatories be answered, a formal motion 
was filed to compel the answers and to strike the February , 
16, 1971 trial date. (S.R. pp. 17, 18) The hearing on 
this motion was scheduled for January 19, 1971 and Mr. 
Gibson was mailed a copy of both the motion and the notice 1 
of hearing thereon. ( S.R. pp. 17 through 20) 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The hearing on January 19, 1971 on this motion was 
heard before Judge Aldon J. Anderson. Attorneys for Sulli-
van and Allen were present but no one appeared for Stewart. 
( R. p. 42 ) Based on this hearing, an order was entered 
ordering plaintiff to answer the September 24, 1970 inter-
rogatories within 15 days and also striking the February 16, 
1971 trial date. A copy of this order was mailed to Mr. 
Gibson on January 22, 1971. (R. pp. 42, 43) Thereafter 
and since there was still no compliance with the order that 
the interrogatories be answered, motions to dismiss were filed 
on behalf of Sullivan on March 4, 1971 and Allen on March 
6, 1971 with copies being mailed to Mr. Gibson on those 
respective dates. ( R. pp. 44 through 4 7 ) 
In order to give Mr. Gibson a further chance to comply 
and answer the interrogatories without the necessity of fur-
ther court appearances, these motions to dismiss were not 
called on for hearing immediately. Also, and during all of 
this period that is being referred to, the attorneys for Sullivan 
and Allen attempted on several occasions to reach Mr. Gibson 
by telephone to discuss these problems with him but were 
never successful in contacting him. Since nothing further was 
heard from Mr. Gibson and on March 23, 1971 a notice of 
a hearing to be heard on April 2, 1971 was mailed to him. 
(R. pp. 48, 49) 
The April 2, 1971 hearing was scheduled to be heard 
before Judge Aldon J. Anderson but the law and motion 
calendar on that date was transferred to Judge Stewart M. 
Hanson. It appears from the affidavits of both Allen's and 
Sullivan's attorneys that they were present in Judge Hanson's 
court at this hearing although not at the same time. (R. PP· 
5 
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60, 61 and 80, 81) In any event, Mr. Gibson was not present 
and the court signed an order on that date dismissing Stewart's 
complaint as against both Sullivan and Allen. The order stated 
only that the complaint was dismissed and did not specify its 
being either with or without prejudice. On this same date of 
April 2, 1971, a copy of the order was mailed to Mr. Gibson. 
(R. p. 51) 
The next court proceeding in this case did not occur for 
almost one year and until March 16, 1972. On that date the 
court through Judge Hanson signed an order, supposedly "on 
its own initiative" in which the court stated as follows: 
A clerical error having been made in the drafting 
of the Order of Dismissal herein in that said order 
omitted the words 'without prejudice' as directed by 
the Court, and said error having come to the attention 
of the Court, 
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 60(a), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court on its own 
initiative corrects said error by amending the Order of 
Dismissal to read as follows: 
It is hereby ordered that plaintiff, Raymond 
Stewart's Complaint as against both defendants, ~oh~ 
L. Sullivan and Richard Monk Allen, be and it ts 
hereby dismissed without prejudice. ( R. p. 5 5) 
As soon as this order came to the attention of Allen and 
Sullivan's attorneys, motions to set it aside were filed. (R. PP· 
58, 59 and 63, 64) Also, both of defendants' attorneys filed 
affidavits. ( R. pp. 80, 81 and 60, 61) In these it was recited 
that neither attorney had ever been "directed" by Judge Hanson ' 
d " · h · d" " d that the that the order be entere wit out pre1u Ke an 
only directive from the court at the hearing was that the mo-
6 
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tion was granted and the complaint as against both defendants 
was dismissed. Likewise, the minute entry in the docket book 
for the hearing of April 2, 1971 indicates only that the 
motion to dismiss was granted and says nothing about its 
being "without prejudice." (R. p. 61) The record in this 
case is unmistakably dear that if the court, in fact, intended 
that the dismissal be "without prejudice" that this was never 
in any way communicated to defendants' counsel until March 
of 1972 and nearly one year after the hearing itself. 
After the filing of motions and affidavits by attorneys 
for the defendants, plaintiffs' attorney filed a "Motion To 
Amend The Order On Additional Grounds." (R. pp. 65, 66) 
By this he requested that the court reaffirm its earlier ex parte 
ruling (i.e. that there was a clerical mistake) and he asked 
that the court also grant the same relief on the additional 
ground of 60(b) (7) U.R.C.P. (i.e. that the April 2, 1971 
order be set aside for "any other reason" justifying relief). 
The hearing on the motions just referred to was then heard 
and the motions fully argued by all counsel before Judge 
Hanson on April 13, 1972. Thereafter, the court ruled and 
the minute entry reflects "***the court now being fully ad-
vised in the premises, hereby orders plaintiff's motion be 
denied and defendants' motion granted." ( R. p. 84) This was 
followed up by a formal written order to the same effect 
dated May 3, 1972. (R. pp. 97, 98) In other words, and 
at this point, the court had ruled that the original order of 
April 2, 1971 would stand as entered, and Judge Hanson 
declined to grant relief for "any other reason" and under 
60(b) (7) U.R.C.P. 
7 
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Of course, this ruling didn't satisfy plaintiff's able coun-
sel and so on April 21, 197 2 he filed a further motion en-
titled "Motion For Further Hearing Before Ruling Of The 
Court." (R. pp. 88 through 90) The only ground stated in 
this motion and the affidavits accompanying it was that Mr. 
Gibson had been suspended from the practice of law in Utah 
on May 14, 1971 and that this constituted some basis for 
reversing the court's ruling of April 13, 1971. In fact, it 
was discussed among Judge Hanson and counsel at the hear-
ing of April 13, 1971 that Mr. Gibson had been suspended 
from practice some time in May of 1971 by reason of non-
payment of his Bar fees. Furthermore, Judge Hanson was the 
one who made counsel aware of this fact. 
On May 16, 1972, this further motion was heard before 
the court. This time plaintiff prevailed and the court on May 
25, 1972 signed an order which in substance stated: 
That plaintiff's complaint as against both de-
fendants be and is hereby dismissed 'without prejudice.' 
(R. p. 103) 
Thereafter, both defendants filed their appeal to this court. 
Another matter is mentioned in the affidavits of Messrs. 
Gibson and Schaerrer which involves telephone conversations 
they have had with Allen's attorney and the writer of this 
brief and about which some comment should be made herein. 
In essence, Plaintiff's attorneys seem to be claiming that since 
this writer at a time after April 2, 1971 assumed in his dis-
cussions with them that the order of April 2, 1971 had been 
entered without prejudice, that this should be the interpreta-
tion given that order and even though Rule 41 ( b) U.R.C:P. 
expressly provides otherwise. The apparent attempt by plain· 
8 
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tiff now is to ignore Gibson's total inactivity in this case from 
November, 1970 to May, 1971 and to somehow contend that 
in May of 1971 Gibson was ready to do something on the 
case but was dissuaded from doing so by this one casual con-
versation with Allen's attorney. 
Frankly, at the time this writer had his contacts with 
plaintiff's attorneys after the April 2, 1971 order had been 
signed and up until he had researched the matter in March 
of 1972, he was under the mistaken assumption that the 
law provided the reverse of what Rule 41 ( b) , in fact, does 
provide. It was believed that a dismissal where it was un-
specified either that it was with or without prejudice, resulted 
in a dismissal without prejudice, whereas Rule 41 ( b) pro-
vides that such a dismissal is with prejudice. Until March, 
1972 there had been no reason to research the question and 
this writer had simply prepared the April 2, 1971 order in 
the language asked in his motion and in the language directed 
by the court at the hearing. The motion requested dismissal 
of plaintiff's complaint and when the court stated that the 
motion was granted to dismiss the complaint, this was the 
language used in the order. No attempt was made by counsel 
to make the order more or less binding than as asked for in 
the motion and as granted by the court. 
It is difficult to understand how a conversation between 
opposing counsel about the effect of the order and after it 
was entered could have any bearing on the effect to be given 
that order. This writer in no way requested or suggested to 
Mr. Gibson in their May, 1971 telephone conversation that 
Gibson withhold taking action to set aside whatever may have 
been the legal effect of the April 2, 1971 order. As an ex-
9 
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perienced lawyer representing his own client, Gibson was 
perfectly free to research and arrive at his own conclusion as 
to the legal effect of the order. This writer was not of course 
' ' 
in any type of fiduciary or advisory capacity with Gibson. 
There is no contention by plaintiff that Gibson failed to re-
ceive the letters, motions, orders, etc., up through April 2, 
1971 and there is no contention that he was mislead about 
the legal effect of what was transpiring through the entry of 
the April 2, 1971 order. What occurred after the order was 
entered should have no bearing on its validity or effect. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISMISSAL OF APRIL 2, 1971 WAS UPON 
THE MERITS AND WITH PREJUDICE. 
Unless the plain language of Rule 41(b) U.R.C.P. is 
ignored, it is apparent that at the time of its entry, at least, 
the April 2, 1971 order was a dismissal of plaintiff's com-
plaint as against both defendants "upon the merits" and with 
prejudice. In applicable part, Rule 41( b) states as follows: 
Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. For f~il­
ure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with 
these rules or any order of court, a defen_dant ~ay 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claun against 
him. *** Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this sub-division 
and any dismissal not provided for in this r~le, other 
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper 
venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits. 
10 
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Plaintiff had failed to comply with Rule 33 U.R.C.P. 
relating to the time within which written interrogatories to 
a party were to be answered. The possible penalty for his re-
fusal to do so under Rule 37 (d) U.R.C.P. was dismissal of 
his action. This was not asked for immediately by the de-
fendants, but rather they asked for an order directing that 
the interrogatories be answered. This was uncomplied with 
from its entry on January 22, 1971 until the hearing of April 
2, 1971. The court was therefore amply justified in entering 
the dismissal on April 2, 1971 either for plaintiff's refusal to 
answer the interrogatories or for his non-compliance with the 
l'rior order. 
Plaintiff cannot contend that the court in granting the 
motion to dismiss specified otherwise than simply "a dis-
missal." The affidavits of attorneys for both defendants con-
cerning the April 2, 1971 hearing attest to this. The order 
itself which was undisturbed for nearly a year says only that. 
The minute entry in the docket record offers no contradiction 
or other specification. It is further evident from Judge Han-
son's reversal of the ex parte order of March 16, 1972 by 
his April 13, 1972 minute entry ruling formalized by order 
of May 3, 1972, that he fully recognized that the April 2, 
1971 order was phrased as asked for by the defendants' mo-
tion and as orally directed by him at the hearing of that date. 
Rule 41 (b) U.R.C.P. states that a dismissal of the type 
involved in the instant case "operates as an adjudication upon 
the merits," but does not expressly state that it is a dismissal 
"with prejudice." It is evident from the authorities that "upon 
the merits" and "with prejudice" are virtually synonymous 
phrases. Present Utah Rule 41 ( b) and Federal Rule 41 ( b), 
11 
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in so far as material here, are substantially identical. In com-
menting about the effect of this part of Federal Rule 41 ( b) , 
Professor Moore states in Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 5, 
Section 41.14 as follows: 
Subject to proper qualifications, the thrust of the 
last sentence of Rule 41 ( b) is to make an order of 
dismissal a dismissal with prejudice. Thus, the last 
sentence of Rule 41 ( b) provides that, unless the court 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under Rule 41 ( b) -
i.e., a dismissal on defendant's motion for plaintiff's 
failure to prosecute, or to comply with the Rules or 
any order of court, or for failure to prove a claim -
and any dismissal not provided for in Rule 41 - other 
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, or for im-
proper venue, or for lack of an indispensable party -
operates as an adjudication on the merits. (Footnote 
citations omitted.) 
It is evident that if plaintiff is to be relieved from the 
bar of the dismissal of April 2, 1971, that it must be done 
under the provisions of Rule 60, U.R.C.P. 
POINT II 
NO CLERICAL MISTAKE CORRECTABLE BY 
RULE 60 (a) OR OTHER PROVISION OF LAW 
WAS MADE IN OMITTING THE WORDS 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE FROM THE ORDER OF 
APRIL 2, 1971. 
Inasmuch as the final ruling of Judge Hanson on May 
25, 1972 simply states that the dismissal of plaintiffs com-
plaint is "without prejudice" and doesn't specify the legal 
grounds or citation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure upo~ 
which it is based, it may be argued by the plaintiff on this 
12 
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appeal that the ruling was based on Rule 60(a) U.R.C.P. 
That rule allows a court to correct "clerical mistakes in * * * 
orders ***" and plaintiff may argue that the omission of the 
words "without prejudice" was this kind of a mistake. In fact, 
such an order by Judge Hanson was entered on March 16, 
1971, ex parte and without any prior notice to defendants' 
attorneys although he reversed this order by his later order 
of April 13, 1972 formalized by his written order of May 
3, 1972. 
As already stated by this defendant in arguing Point I 
above, there is no evidence in this case that counsel, the clerk 
or the court made any error in the manner in which the April 
2, 1971 order was worded or entered. The most that may be 
said is that Judge Hanson, reflecting back on events in April, 
1971 from a vantage point of approximately one year later, 
did indicate that he would have specified the order have been 
"without prejudice," if he had the matter to do over again. 
On other occasions, Judge Hanson did claim that his intention 
in April, 1971 had been that it be "without prejudice" although 
he readily conceded that this intention was unexpressed if such 
did exist. 
On these facts, it is clear that if there was any error in 
the April 2, 1971 order that it was a "judicial error" and not 
a clerical one. The distinction between these two types of 
errors is fully discussed in Richards v. Siddoway, 24 U.2d 314, 
471 P.2d 143 ( 1970) and it is very clear from that case that 
if there was an error in the instant case, it was judicial and 
not clerical. The Richards case further makes clear that Rule 
60 (a) allows correction only of clerical and not judicial errors. 
The latter must be corrected by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, 
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by awarding a new trial or by any means specially provided 
by statute. See also to this same general effect Blankenship 
et al. v. Royalty Holding Co., 202 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1953). 
POINT III 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE DO NOT JUSTIFY 
THE PLAINTIFF'S BEING RELIEVED FROM 
THE FINAL ORDER OF APRIL 2, 1971 AND 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 60(b), 
UR.C.P. 
It becomes clear upon analysis of the facts and law re-
lating to this case that if the trial court's ruling is to be sus-
tained that it must be upon the basis of Rule 60 ( b) U.R.C.P. 
and specifically subsection ( 7) thereof. In applicable part, 
Rule 60 ( b) is as follows: 
( b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; 
Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding for the following reasons: ( 1) mistake, in-
advertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; ( 2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due negligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 5 9 ( b) ; ( 3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic) , misrepresentation, 
or other misconduct of an adverse party; ( 4) when, 
for any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendants as required ~y 
Rule 4 ( e) and the defendant has failed to appear tn 
said action; ( 5) the judgment is void; ( 6) the judg-
ment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a 
prior judgment upon which it i~ ?ased has been r.e-
versed or otherwise vacated, or It IS no longer equit-
14 
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abl~ that the judgment should have prospective appli-
cat10n; or .0) any ot?er reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the Judgment. The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons ( 1 ) , 
( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , or ( 4) , not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
*** 
Since the first motion by plaintiff's attorney and follow-
ing the April 2, 1971 order was not made until April 6, 1972 
and more than one year following the entry of the order from 
which plaintiff sought to be relieved, it is evident that sub-
sections ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) cannot serve as the basis for 
the court's ruling. These require that the motion be made 
not more than three months after the entry of the order. Sub-
sections ( 5 ) and ( 6) of Rule 60 ( b) are obviously inapplic-
able, leaving subsection ( 7) as the only possible grounds. 
Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) allows the court to set aside the order 
of dismissal of April 2, 1971 for "any other reason justifying 
relief." This is broad language and superficially might appear 
to allow, if not suggest, that relief be granted in this particu-
lar case. After all, the plaintiff in this case was apparently 
personally innocent of any neglect in what occurred. Plain-
tiff has been denied a hearing on the merits and in a situation 
where the liability is claimed to be in his favor and his injuries 
are claimed to be serious. No real prejudice has been shown 
by the defendants, except possibly the passage of time, and 
plaintiff will argue that the defendants will not be hurt if the 
plaintiff is given a hearing on the merits. Plaintiff's argument 
will continue that courts abhor a forfeiture of rights and an 
adjudication barring a claim particularly where there has been 
no hearing on the merits. 
15 
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On the other hand, it is respectfully submitted that if this 
case and record are examined carefully and not superficially, 
it will be seen that there is no factual basis for relief to this 
plaintiff under Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) or any other provision of Utah 
law. It is true that the facts of this case give rise to consider-
able sympathy for the plaintiff individually and his situation. 
However, this factor should not cause the court to ignore or 
enlarge the rules, including 60 ( b) ( 7), that the court itself 
has laid down for the orderly handling of cases and the ad-
ministration of justice as it relates to an entire system of law 
and not simply to an individual case. 
An examination of the record will disclose that plain-
tiff and his attorneys have never offered any real explanation 
as to what occurred from plaintiff and his attorneys' stand-
point up to and including April 2, 1971 and to allow the order 
of that date to be entered in the first place. The only possible 
explanation in the record is from Gibson's affidavit of April 
12, 1972 wherein he states: "That following the dismissal of 
this case, he had a telephone conversation with David K. Win-
der, attorney for defendant, and advised Mr. Winder that he 
had not answered the interrogatories because he had been tied 
up in the Legislature." (R. p. 85) Even here, the claim is not 
necessarily that he was so "tied up" but that he told this to one 
of the attorneys involved some time after April 2, 1971. Con-
sidering that Mr. Gibson did give an affidavit in this case, he 
certainly could have elaborated therein as to what he was 
involved with in the legislature that caused the problem and 
why generally this case was handled as it was up to April 2, 
1971. In the absence of any explanation or even an attempted 
explanation from him, it seems consistent with established 
rules of fact finding to assume for purposes of this case that 
16 
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there is no satisfactory explanation. There is no claim of illness , 
no claim of lack of notice or awareness of the proceedings that 
were being had. There is no claim that Mr. Gibson had ceased 
to represent the plaintiff or that something about their relation-
ship prevented him from representing the plaintiff adequately. 
It is also clear that through the time of the April 2, 1971 
hearing and for more than a month thereafter, that Mr. Gib-
son was fully authorized to practice law and represent the 
plaintiff and had been selected by the plaintiff for this purpose. 
Plaintiff's present attorneys lay great stress on what oc-
curred after the April 2, 1971 hearing and particularly on the 
fact that Mr. Gibson was not able to practice law after May 14, 
1971. The claim on this seems to be that this prevented Gibson 
from taking any action to obtain relief from the order on April 
2, 1971. This argument makes little sense considering that 
Mr. Gibson had done absolutely nothing over the period of 
November, 1970 through April 2, 1971 to avoid the sanctions 
attending failure to answer the interrogatories and where he 
could have avoided any serious problem simply by a telephone 
call or letter to either of the opposing attorneys or to the court. 
More important, what difference could it have made if he had 
not been suspended from practice on May 14, 1971. A final 
order had been entered April 2, 1971. The time for appeal, 
which is jurisdictional, had run prior to May 14th, and even 
assuming there was some grounds to appeal. He possibly could 
have invoked subsection ( 1) of Rule 60 ( b) and claimed that 
some "mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect" 
had been involved, thereby giving him up to three months 
from April 2, 1971. However, it is obvious from the rec~rd 
that neither Mr. Gibson nor plaintiff's present attorneys claun 
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any such mistake, etc., existed and, as noted above, they have 
offered no explanation or excuse for what did occur which 
could possibly excuse his conduct under 60 ( b) ( 1). 
Mr. Neil D. Schaerrer filed an affidavit in this case. (R. 
pp. 67 through 71) Although Mr. Schaerrer handled this case 
with commendable zeal after it first came to his attention, it 
is apparent from his affidavit that what he did, and considering 
when he got in to the case, can have no logical bearing on the 
issues before this court on this appeal. His affidavit discloses 
that he was first contacted by the plaintiff in September of 
1971. Mr. Schaerrer's first contact with opposing counsel was 
in October of 1971. By that time, at least six months had 
elapsed from the April 2, 1971 order. Mr. Schaerrer alleges 
in his affidavit a number of things that occurred in October, 
1971 and thereafter. The attempted implication from his affi-
davit is that these events after October, 1971 should somehow 
serve as a basis for relieving plaintiff from the April 2, 1971 
order. These included that counsel for Allen told him in Oc-
tober, 1971 that the dismissal was without prejudice. They 
also include the claim, which was undoubtedly true, that there-
after he did considerable work. He further alleges that he 
delayed for some time, and perhaps as long as six months, the 
filing of a formal motion because he believed that the dis-
missal was without prejudice. Of course, the implication from 
Mr. Schaerrer's affidavit is that since this writer had discussed 
with him that the dismissal was without prejudice, this six-
month delay was therefore this writer's fault and not Mr. 
Schaerrer' s. 
For purposes of argument, assume Mr. Schaerrer had 
immediately filed the motion, not as he did on April 6, 1972, 
but instead in October of 1971 and as soon as he determined 
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~o take any action in the case. What difference could this poss-
ibly have made? There is nothing in Rule 60 ( b) or any other 
provision of law that would differentiate between six months 
or a year as it relates to the failure to file a motion and seek 
relief from a final order in a case such as this. Mr. Schaerrer's 
affidavit may have some effect in plaintiff's favor in this case 
because it compounds our sympathy for the plaintiff and the 
injustice to him and even possibly to Mr. Schaerrer himself. 
It should have no other effect since there is no relevance be-
tween events six months and longer after the entry of a judg-
ment or order and whether that judgment or order should be 
set aside under Rule 60 ( b) . It makes about as much sense to 
claim that the plaintiff's injuries have become worse, that the 
liability can now be proven more strongly in his favor or even 
that he needs the money more, as it does to talk about what 
his attorneys did six months after the law, as provided in Rule 
41 ( b), had adjudicated that his claim had been dismissed on 
the merits. 
Simply stated, this case comes down to whether the negli-
gence or indifference of an attorney should suffice to serve as a 
basis for granting relief under subsection ( 7 ) of Rule 60 ( b) . 
If it can and if this court adopts such a rule, as it must to af-
firm this case, then it ought to also serve as the basis for saving 
a client from the negligence or indifference of his attorney in 
other types of situations where the client loses his claim 
through a so-called technicality and not on the merits. For ex-
ample, why shouldn't a client be relieved from the running 
of the statute of limitations if it results from the negligence of 
his attorney. Should the client not have to bear the faeful 
consequences of an attorney's negligent failure to file a timely 
appeal? More commonly, should the client be relieved when 
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the negligence of his lawyer causes him to lose and by reason 
of the lawyer's failure to present the proper legal theory or to 
adequately develop the facts? 
The issue of whether the negligence of an attorney should 
relieve a client from a final order of dismissal was involved 
in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 8 1. ed. 2d 734, 
82 S.Ct. 1386 ( 1962). In the Link case the trial judge dismiss-
ed with prejudice the plaintiff's complaint after the plaintiff's 
attorney failed to appear for a scheduled pre-trial conference. 
This order was entered despite a telephone message from plain-
tiff's counsel that he would be unable to attend because he was 
160 miles away and busy preparing papers for filing in an-
other court. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority of the 
Supreme Court and in affirming the dismissal, stated as fol-
lows relating to the issue of whether the client should suffer 
for what his attorney had done: 
There is certainly no merit to the contention that 
dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's 
unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the 
client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his 
representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid 
the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely 
selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly in-
consistent with our system of representative litigation, 
in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his 
lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all 
facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney. 
The same result was reached in Schwarz v. United States 
of America, 384 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1967). In the Schwarz 
case the plaintiff's case had been pending for about five years 
and a trial date was set and notification was given to the plain-
tiff's attorney. On the date of trial the plaintiff's attorney ap-
20 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
peared but advised that he was not ready to proceed and re-
quested a continuance. Upon motion by the defendant, the 
trial judge granted a dismissal for failure to prosecute under 
Rule 41 ( b) F.R.C.P. On appeal, the Court of Appeals af-
firmed and stated that it was unfortunate and it recognized that 
its affirmance might well deny a plaintiff with a meritorious 
cause of action his day in court. However, the court went on 
to state: 
If the attorney's conduct was substantially below 
what is reasonable under the circumstances, the client's 
remedy is a suit for malpractice. If the trial court's 
commendable efforts to move business on its calendars 
are ever to succeed, they must be supported. A client 
damaged by such neglect has his remedy against coun-
sel. 
Ohliger v. United States of America, et al., 308 F.2d 667 
( 2d Gr. 1962) and Newton v. United States of America, 308 
F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1962) were two companion cases in which 
the plaintiffs' complaints were dismissed for failure to prose-
cute and by reason of plaintiffs' failure to answer written in-
terrogatories. In both cases a motion was made under Rule 
60 ( b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to vacate the 
dismissals and upon denial, appeal was taken. Both cases were 
affirmed. In affirming the Newton case, the court in a per 
curiam order said in part as follows: 
Counsel's breach of duty to his clients is still more 
obvious in this case than in the companion case, for 
here counsel did not even appear for the Review Call 
on December 7, 1960, at which time the appellants' 
complaint was dismissed without prejudice for lac~ 
of prosecution. Counsel contends that h~ was not n?tt-
f ied of the call, but Judge Ryan, in denym? the motion 
to set aside the dismissal, found that nottee was duly 
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given. Furthermore the Law Journal carried notice 
of this calendar call. Not only has the appellant failed 
to prosecute his suit and to answer the Government's 
interrogatories, but his motion to vacate the dismissal 
was delayed for another ten months after his suit was 
dismissed. The conduct of counsel is replete with dila-
toriness which no court should condone; and counsel's 
plea to ignorance of federal procedure only compounds 
his carelessness. 
The federal cases have generally held that neither ignorance 
nor carelessness on the part of an attorney will provide grounds 
for relief under Federal Rule 60 ( b). See Hoff man v. Cele-
brezze, 405 F.2d 833, (8th Cir. 1969) and U.S.A. v. Thomp-
son, 438 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1971). 
The Utah Supreme Court, in dicta, reached the same con-
clusion in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., et al., 123 U.2d 416, 
260 P.2d 741 (1953) although the facts of the Warren case 
were not as close in point to the instant facts as are those in 
the federal cases just cited. In the Warren case a default judg-
ment was taken against certain defendants and in the later 
attempts by the defendants to have the default judgment set 
aside, the issue was raised as to the client's right to counsel and 
to be competently assisted by counsel. On that point, the court, 
through Justice McDonough, stated: 
And although a judgment may be erroneously 
and inequitable, equitable relief will not be grant~ 
to a party thereto on the sole ground that the negli-
gence of the attorney, agent, trustee or other repres~n­
tative of the present complainant prevented a fair mal. 
Our law is full of instances where the innocent principal 
is bound by the negligent agent. It is uniformly held that this 
does not serve to excuse the principal. Counsel has found no 
22 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
case comparable to the instant one and where a final order 
was entered solely through the unexplained negligence or in-
difference of the plaintiff's attorney and where any court has 
granted relief on that basis under Rule 60 ( b) ( 7). 
In every instance where the Utah Supreme Court has 
granted relief under Rule 60 ( b) ( 7 ) , there have been at least 
some kind of mitigating or excusable circumstances which 
occurred prior to the entry of the final order and which par-
tially, at least, served as the basis for granting the relief. For 
example, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed relief granted 
under Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) in Ney v. Harrison, 5 U.2d 217, 299 
P.2d 1114 (1956), where the defendant had allowed a judg-
ment by default for a creditor to be taken against her but 
where she had been under the mistaken assumption that her 
decree of divorce which ordered her ex-husband to pay the 
debt required her ex-husband to bear the obligation and to de-
fend the action for her. See also Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite 
Co., 14 U.2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962). In the Mayhew case 
the Supreme Court reversed an order of the District Court re-
fusing to set aside a judgment by default under Rule 60 ( b). 
That case might be cited as authority for the liberality in giving 
the plaintiff his day in court on the merits. However, it is to be 
noted that the court in Mayhew made clear that the default 
judgment should be set aside only under circumstances "where 
there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside." 
Another Utah case that has bearing on the instant case is 
Board of Education of Granite School District v. Cox, 14 U.2d 
385, 384 P.2d 806 ( 1963). This case involved Rule 60 (b) (7) 
and also Rule 60 (b) (1). In the Cox case the defendant was 
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served with process and failed to answer within the 20 days 
specified in the summons and prior to the time that plaintiff 
Granite School District took a judgment by default against 
him. He was not represented by counsel at that time and in 
attempting to have the judgment against him set aside, he 
contended that he had thought the summons and complaint 
was invalid because he thought a judge had to sign the sum-
mons for it to be valid. He further claimed that he had been 
under the impression that the plaintiff was not entitled to the 
relief prayed for in the complaint. In affirming the denial of 
the trial court to set aside the default judgment against him, 
Justice McDonough, speaking for the court stated the following: 
The trial court was guided by Rule 60 ( b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which outlines the 
situations wherein a party may have a judgment set 
aside. There are seven categories therein only two of 
which have application here. They are: ( 1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; ( 2) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. In his reasons for setting the judgment 
aside the defendant has specifically set out number one 
above and evidently in an effort to qualify under the 
second category has asserted the following additional 
reasons: ( 1) the judgment entered was based upon a 
void contract for the reason that the same did not com-
ply with the State of Frauds; .< 2) ~he purported. con-
tract was void for lack of consideration; ( 3) the iudg-
ment is inequitable. 
Appellant in asserting the Statute of Fr~uds and 
lack of consideration has set forth defenses whICh apply 
to the merits of the case and have no application as to 
why appellant did not answer within th~ time allotted. 
We are concerned only with why he did not answer, 
not with what kind of answer would he give if he were 
24 
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s? incl!ned. This latter question arises only after con-
s1derat1on of the first question and a sufficient excuse 
therefrom being shown. 
In the instant case we have an argument by plaintiff's 
counsel that is similar to that of counsel for the defendant in 
the Cox case. That is, we are furnished considerable informa-
tion about how good plaintiff's case is on the merits, but no in-
formation about why the case was allowed to be dismissed. If 
this court follows its precedents, it should not consider the 
merits and considering the total lack of showing of "sufficient 
excuse" or "reasonable justification or excuse" for why the 
April 2, 1971 order was dismissed. 
POINT IV. 
THE ORDER OF MAY 25, 1972 MAKING THE 
APRIL 2, 1971 ORDER A DISMISSAL WITH-
OUT PREJUDICE WAS INV AUD SINCE 
THERE IS NO PROCEDURE UNDER UTAH 
LAW FOR A REHEARING OR FURTHER 
HEARING BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT 
AND ONCE IT HAS RULED. 
The proceedings that took place in this case during March 
through May of 1972 typify a practice that should not be 
permitted to be followed in the District Court. It allows counsel 
who is dissatisfied with a ruling to simply turn around and 
petition for a rehearing, motion to reconsider, or whatever 
other way it is denominated and all of which are simply at-
tempts to change a ruling already validly entered. In the in-
stant case there was a full hearing on all of the issues involved 
with full participation by the court and counsel. Thereafter, 
the court ruled in the defendants' favor and against the plain-
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tiff, this occurring on April 13, 1972. A minute entry of that 
date announcing the decision was entered and a formal order 
was entered May 3, 1972. This should have ended the pro-
ceedings in the District Court. Instead, plaintiff's attorney filed 
on April 21, 1972 a "Motion For Further Hearing Before Rul-
ing Of The Court." As stated, the court had already ruled 
through its minute entry of April 13, 1972. Also, there was 
nothing in this new motion of plaintiff's attorney or the 
affidavits accompanying it that had not already been considered 
by the court. This motion did claim to raise the new factual 
issue that Mr. Gibson had been suspended from the practice 
of law on May 14, 1971. This was hardly new since it had 
been discussed at the April 13, 1971 hearing and Judge Hanson 
had been the one who had advised counsel of this fact. More-
over, and for reasons argued under Point III above, whether 
Mr. Gibson could or could not practice after May 14, 1971 has 
no materiality to the issues raised before the District Court 
or on this appeal. 
Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 24 U.2d 
211, 469 P.2d 1 ( 1970) involved a situation where the Dis-
trict Court granted a summary judgment of foreclosure in 
favor of the plaintiff and against certain of the defendants. 
Later on, these defendants moved to vacate the judgment and 
the court denied this motion. Still later, the defendants filed a 
"Motion To Reconsider" and this was granted to the defend-
ants without notice or a hearing, in effect, vacating the sum-
mary judgment that had been entered in favor of the plain-
tiff. In reversing the District Court and reinstating the sum· 
mary judgment of foreclosure, the Supreme Court, through Jus-
tice Henriod, indicated that "* * * we are unaware of any 
such motion under our rules * * *" and he concluded the 
opinion by stating: 
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We think the motion to reconsider the motion to 
vacate the judgment is abortive under the rules but 
even if it weren't, it was error under the rules ro' hear 
and act upon it without notice. We conclude that the 
judgment of. foreclosure unappealed from, must stand 
absent any tunely appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court in evaluating the effect to be 
given the ruling of a District Court has often stated, in sub-
stance, that it will presume correctness in the lower court's de-
cision and will grant large latitude and discretion to the lower 
court, not disturbing its decision unless a clear abuse of discre-
tion is shown. This "presumption" in favor of the lower court's 
decision is undoubtedly a very useful principle to be followed by 
an appellate court and particularly where the facts are disputed 
and where something is to be gained from the lower court's 
first-hand involvement with the controversy. However, this 
principle hardly applies here. In the first place, there isn't any 
dispute about the facts and this court is as qualified in every 
respect to rule on the issues as was Judge Hanson. Secondly, 
if this presumption is indulged in this particular case, to which 
ruling is it applied; the first one of May 3, 1972 favoring the 
defendants, or the latter one of May 25, 1972 favoring the 
plaintiff. (Dates of formal orders are used rather than the 
dates of minute entry decisions.) If the Supreme Court believes 
that it is the last ruling by Judge Hanson that is important and 
that is entitled to this presumption, then, at the least, the 
earlier ruling should be entitled to the same presumption ex-
cepting only for what the plaintiff will claim is the additional 
evidence that was adduced between the two hearings; i.e. the 
fact of Mr. Gibson's suspension from practice on May 14, 
1971. Following through with this reasoning, the first ruling 
of May 3, 1972 should stand and be deferred to by the Su-
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preme Court unless it believes that the fact of Mr. Gibson's 
suspension is of sufficient weight to cause it to reverse the 
prior ruling favoring the defendants. 
With all due respect for Judge Hanson, it is submitted 
that the rulings made by him during March through May of 
1972 in this case are sufficiently contradictory that little, if 
anything, can be presumed from them. It is submitted that the 
Supreme Court should therefore consider and decide this mat-
ter on the record before it. 
CONCLUSION 
On April 2, 1971 and after notice and hearing, the Dis-
trict Court granted both defendants' motions to dismiss plain-
tiff's complaint by reason of plaintiff's failure to answer written 
interrogatories and also by reason of plaintiff's disobedience 
of an order directing that the interrogatories be answered. This 
dismissal was upon the merits and with prejudice under Rule 
41 (b). Prior to its entry every reasonable attempt had been 
made to give the plaintiff and his attorney an opportunity to 
answer the interrogatories and have the case proceed ahead on 
the merits. 
On May 25, 1972 the District Court by order purported to 
amend the April 2, 1971 order and to make the dismissal one 
without prejudice. This was apparently done pursuant to auth-
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ority of Rule 60 ( b). That rule and Utah law generally do not 
allow amendment of the earlier order under these facts and 
particularly where there has been no explanation or excuse as 
to why plaintiff and his attorney allowed the April 2, 1971 
order to be entered in the first place. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
DAVID K. WINDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Richard Monk Allen 
'7 rh-I hereby certify that on the ---------------- day of November, 
197 2 I mailed ten copies of this brief to the clerk of the Su-
preme Court, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, four 
copies to Jack L. Schoenhals, Attorney for Defendant Sullivan, 
Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah and four copies to David 
E. West, Attorney for Plaintiff Stewart, Walker Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DAVID K. WINDER 
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